Hardening roadmap
Verification systems decay: fraud techniques evolve, document designs change, models age. This page is the standing process that keeps BAQSHI-KYC improving — and the honest queue of what’s not done yet.
The improvement loop
Section titled “The improvement loop”Every source of “something went wrong” feeds one loop:
detect (monitoring / review / incident / report) → record (roadmap entry: signal, impact, evidence) → tune or build (threshold, prompt guidance, new check) → validate (against the calibration set + the new case) → ship (versioned, audit-logged config/code change)Rules for the loop:
- Every reviewer overturn is a data point. When a human approves what the pipeline flagged (or catches what it missed), the reason goes into the queue.
- Every incident closes with a roadmap entry — Runbooks in Incident response end by filing one.
- Keep a calibration set. Known-good pairs + known spoofs, re-run after every threshold or model change. Never tune on vibes.
- Changes ship via git + deploy — thresholds live in code, so every tuning decision has an author, a diff, and a rollback.
Current queue (honest state, priority order)
Section titled “Current queue (honest state, priority order)”| # | Item | Why | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Threshold calibration on real documents | Defaults are literature-derived, not population-tested; auto-approve shouldn’t be fully trusted until this runs | Blocks real users |
| 2 | Passive anti-spoof model (e.g. Silent-Face) as a second liveness signal | Closes the pre-recorded-victim-video gap in the threat model | Planned |
| 3 | AML screening — sanctions/PEP list matching post-approval | Required for AML/CFT reporting entities; the data feeds are commercial, the matching is straightforward | Planned |
| 4 | Review queue web UI | Queue is API-only; a small internal page speeds reviews and reduces errors | Planned |
| 5 | Per-tenant API keys + usage isolation | Prerequisite to offering this as a service to others | Planned |
| 6 | Redis-backed rate limiting | Current limiter is per-instance memory; needed before horizontal scaling | When scaling |
| 7 | Master key in KMS/HSM | Removes the platform-env single point from the threat model | When stakes justify |
| 8 | NFC chip reading (passports) | Cryptographic document authenticity beats visual inspection entirely | Aspirational |
Reporting a weakness
Section titled “Reporting a weakness”Anyone using or probing this system: report suspected vulnerabilities privately to the operator (GitHub repository → private security advisory, or the operator’s direct contact). Good-faith research against your own test verifications is welcome; don’t probe real users’ data. Reports get a roadmap entry and a response — that’s the deal.